Is the voter only a tweet away? Micro-blogging in the 2009 European Parliament elections by Vergeer, M.R.M. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/99446
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
  
 
 
 
This study explores the use of Twitter by candidates, in particular their networking and micro–
blogging activities in the election campaign for the European Parliament elections of 2009 in the 
Netherlands. The main focus is on identifying what political aspects (e.g., party characteristics and 
candidate characteristics) influences their use of Twitter as a campaign tool. Furthermore, we 
explore the effectiveness of candidates’ activities on Twitter in gaining votes. 
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Introduction 
In many Western countries, politics increasingly suffers from a decline of interest and participation in 
the political processes (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007). This not only applies to national politics but 
also, and even more so, to European politics. The European Union in particular suffers from a severe 
democratic deficit (cf., van Os, et al., 2007). In general, support for the European Union is low: only a 
small majority (52 percent) supports its country’s EU membership (European Commission, 2009). The 
steady decline of voter turnout (43 percent for the entire EU in 2009; European Parliament, 2009) for 
the European Parliament elections underlines this. The Netherlands, although its population supports 
the European Union membership quite strongly (78 percent), shows a voter turnout of only 37 
percent, which is well below the EU average. Even though support for the EU remains relatively 
stable, it is not clear whether the steady decline in voter turnout is reversible. 
Thus politicians are challenged to reduce this growing gap between citizens and politics. E–
campaigning and in particular Twitter, which is the focus of this study, creates greater visibility and 
increased interactivity between politicians and citizens, and shows potential to mobilize people to 
become politically involved, which in turn should reduce the gap between politics and citizens. 
The Internet as a campaigning tool 
From the moment it became popular among the general population the Internet, in particular the 
Web, was viewed as a means of trying to reverse the declining political participation (European 
Parliament, 2009). Parties and candidates indeed increasingly use Web sites to communicate and 
connect with the electorate (Kluver, et al., 2007). This new campaign strategy — emerging at the end 
of the last century — was coined ‘professional’ by Gibson and Römmele (2001). With the rise of 
individualization and modernization in society and declining political involvement and interest in 
politics, parties search for new options to reach individual voters by using the Internet, and applying 
a marketing approach to target specific groups of people. 
Even though studies on Web campaigning are numerous, most online campaigns analyzed are Web 
1.0 campaigns (cf., Foot, et al., 2007; Norris, 2001, 2003; Tedesco, 2004). The concept of Web 1.0 
indicates that Web sites are predominantly hierarchical and disseminating, from the politician and 
party directly to the citizens, using standard technology (predominantly html). The benefits of Web 
1.0 in political campaigning have been described by Barber, et al. (1997): interactivity, potential for 
horizontal and lateral communication; non–hierarchical communication; low costs for users; speed of 
communication; no national or geographical boundaries; freedom from intrusion and monitoring by 
government. Although these characteristics are valid for Web 1.0, these options were still 
underutilized. Technical limitations and low user–friendliness still limited the extensive use by 
producers and consumers. Web 2.0 (Cormode and Krishnamurthy, 2008; O’Reilly, 2005), 
characterized by innovations (e.g., AJAX, the Web as a platform), is suitable for people to engage 
directly and interact with others on the Web. Keywords associated with Web 2.0 are bottom–up 
approach, sharing of content, online collaborating between people and socializing among people and 
networking. Today, in election campaigns, Web 2.0 applications are considered to be even more 
appropriate to close or, at least, decrease the gap between politics, politicians and citizens. Although 
the arguments in favor of Web 2.0 seem compelling the next section will show that the utilization of 
Web 2.0 in politics does not live up to its democratization and leveling promises. 
The present study will focus on the candidate’s use of the micro–blogging and social networking 
service Twitter as a new tool for campaigning. Nevertheless, we stress that, even though academic 
attention is increasingly focused on Web 2.0 campaigning, studying Web 1.0 campaigning still shows 
theoretical and empirical refinements, such as longitudinal analysis (cf., Larsson, 2011), and cross–
national comparative analysis (cf., Vergeer, et al., forthcoming). 
  
 
Politicians’ use of Web 2.0 
When reviewing the opportunities these new Web 2.0 technologies offer, we see that the 
architecture of Web 2.0 allows non–experts to use the Web and to contribute to it in a way that was 
not possible in the Web 1.0 era. This not only gives the possibility of closing the gap between 
politicians and the electorate, it also holds out the promise of to closing the digital divide between 
people in general. As such, it has potential to increase democratization and emancipation, especially 
for those categories of people caught in disadvantaged positions. Even politicians, especially those 
who receive little attention from the traditional media, can now publish their opinions easily through 
new and additional Web channels such as personal Web sites, (micro–)blogging sites and social 
networking sites. 
With the introduction of Web 2.0, many parties, politicians and candidates adopted blogging, social 
network sites and sharing sites (De Zúñiga, et al., 2009; Gueorguieva, 2008), thus the question arises 
whether this is a new campaigning style, different from the other types. If so, what are the basic 
characteristics of this new campaigning style? Web 2.0, with popular examples such as Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter, also allows politicians to individualize and personalize their campaigning style. 
By doing so, politicians try to decrease the psychological distance between themselves and voters 
(Caprara, et al., 1999). 
An important benefit of the Web and (micro–)blogging in particular is that by ignoring the 
institutionalized traditional media it allows for greater autonomy of the candidate due to more direct 
communication. Using the Web also allows politicians and candidates to operate relatively 
autonomously from the party. It can be argued that some parties (e.g., right–wing parties) allow their 
candidates more autonomy than other parties (left–wing and conservative parties). Whether this is 
beneficial to the party’s strategy is unclear. It is very easy for candidates to debate online without the 
necessary restraint and so permitting slips of the tongue causing the party more harm than good. 
A formalization of the prior arguments, which can be described as an e–optimist view, is the 
innovation hypothesis (cf., Schweitzer, 2008) which states that certain characteristics of new media 
technologies fundamentally change the way politics is brought to the public. It differs from the 
offline patterns of electioneering and offers opportunities to revitalize rational ideals on democratic 
discourse. 
Although these are compelling arguments underlining the benefits of Web 2.0 for political 
engagement, the counter arguments are also convincing: those parties that are already in an position 
of advantage, established parties and those in power, will possess more strategic knowledge, but 
also have more resources to support the utilization of new technology to further advance their lead: 
through long experience these parties have built up more means, such as knowledge about 
campaigning, financial resources and human capital, than new and small parties. Margolis, et al. 
(1999) conclude in their study of the use of Web 2.0, that for the U.S. “politics as usual” prevails, 
whereas in the Britain there are also indications supporting the innovation hypothesis. The same 
holds for the use of a typical Web 2.0 platform (YouTube) by U.S. congressional candidates, that was 
augmenting — not replacing — traditional campaigning and was utilized by the best financed 
candidates (Gulati and Williams, 2010). 
The two hypotheses — innovation and normalization — are mutually exclusive: if one hypothesis is 
supported by the data, the other one needs to be refuted. However, the real test of either of these 
hypotheses has yet to be conducted, because many studies have suffered one or more of four 
methodological constraints limiting rigorous testing: (1) data are often cross–sectional instead of 
longitudinal; (2) evidence originates mainly from the U.S.; (3) focused on candidate Web sites; and, 
(4) focusing on Web features and seldom on the content of communications (Schweitzer, 2008). In 
her longitudinal study of political Web sites in German elections (2002–2005), Schweitzer (2008) 
concludes that the innovation hypothesis was partially confirmed, as such, only for the parliamentary 
parties studied [1]. In contrast, the non-parliamentary parties have underutilized the potential of the 
Internet, due to limited financial and human resources. 
Our study will contribute to the discussion of the benefits of using the Internet for political 
campaigning purposes by looking at candidates’ use of one of the most popular and most accessible 
services on the Internet for micro–blogging and online social networking, Twitter. Twitter has a user 
base of millions, reaching people right across the world and is used in traditional political 
campaigning (e.g., continuous and electoral campaigning) but also for non–traditional political 
activism (e.g., Iran in 2009, Tunis in 2010, Egypt in 2011). Furthermore, the influence of Twitter is felt 
beyond the its network since Twitter’s popularity caught the attention of mainstream media which 
now report regularly on politicians’ Twitter messages. 
In our study, we will focus specifically on three major questions. 
To what extent did political candidates with different political backgrounds adopt micro–blogging as 
a campaigning tool in the European Parliament elections 2009? 
To what degree are these differences in political background related to the activity (micro–blogging 
and social networking) on the micro–blogging platform? 
To what extent is micro–blogging effective in gaining votes? 
  
 
Hypotheses 
The use of Web strategies 
Establishment 
Parties that were founded a long time ago as well as governing parties are viewed as being part of 
the establishment. These established parties, at least, appeal to a significant fraction of the 
electorate, enough to secure some basic and continued presence in Parliament. In general, leading 
politicians from these established parties receive a fair amount of media attention in the traditional 
media (television, newspaper and radio) (cf., Scholten and Ruigrok, 2006). Because of the limited 
space available in traditional media (time and square inches), the overrepresentation of established 
parties leaves new and small parties at a disadvantage. Since the Web solves this scarcity by 
providing virtually limitless space, new or less successful parties can use the Web as additional and 
alternative channels to increase visibility. Restrictions in terms of finance, time and space imposed by 
third parties (i.e., publishers and broadcasters) apply less in the Internet age. 
Web 2.0 is very easy to use, mobile and the costs are very low, providing disadvantaged parties and 
candidates (e.g., few financial resources, little knowledge and small work force) increased 
opportunities to create more online visibility. New and smaller parties consist of politicians whose 
daily activities not only involve politics but also those of their regular jobs, which they still have to 
keep. Therefore, the benefit of the Web for smaller, less professionally organized parties and 
candidates might prove to be greater than for the more well–established parties and candidates. As 
such, the Web in general and micro–blogging specifically is believed to have the potential to overturn 
existing differences in general party and candidate visibility. 
However, prior research does not show that less established parties benefit from the utilization of 
new media. According to Gibson and Ward (2009), larger parties in Parliament offer more 
sophisticated online campaigns than other parties. Exceptions are Green parties and far right parties 
that exploit new technology extensively. Chen and Smith (2010) also found that opposition parties 
use the Internet more often than incumbent parties. Therefore, contrary to the innovation 
hypothesis, the normalization hypothesis (Margolis, et al., 1999) states that the power distribution 
online is merely a replication of the offline power distribution. Larger parties might still have the 
upper hand because they have the advantage of a strategic department dealing continuously with 
publicity issues, and professional politicians that deal with politics as a daily business, as well as 
having greater experience. 
This implies that established parties use new media technology more effectively than new, fringe 
parties do. To test whether the innovation hypothesis holds for Twitter, the following three–part 
hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 1) Candidates from parties that do not belong to the establishment 
adopt micro–blogging more; 
micro–blog more frequently; and, 
perform more social networking 
than candidates from parties that belong to the establishment. 
Ideology 
Ideology refers to ideas about how society should be organized, what societal goals should be 
achieved, and how to accomplish this. Keman (2007) argues that, in addition to the left versus right 
positioning of parties, another dimension is relevant: progressive versus conservative. Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel (2008) identified both dimensions within the Dutch political system. 
Regarding left–wing versus right–wing ideology, it can also be argued that candidates from left–wing 
political parties are those candidates who are also the most communicative ones. Left–wing parties 
are more focused on a cohesive and supportive society, caring for weaker and disadvantaged groups 
in society. These characteristics might explain why left–wing parties use micro–blogging more 
extensively to connect to and engage with the electorate. However, an opposing argument is that 
more left–wing political parties promote collective action, whereas more right–wing thought 
propagates individual freedom. Applying this argument to electoral campaigning, one would expect 
that candidates from left–wing parties would conduct the campaign as a party collective and not 
individually. Right–wing parties on the other hand, would allow their candidates to design their 
campaign more freely and in an individualized way. Allowing candidates to use Twitter provides 
candidates with more freedom, less party control over how candidates perform in their campaign. 
Furthermore, Gibson and Römmele (2001) suggest that right–wing parties are more willing to use a 
more business–like, professional campaigning approach, an approach the more left–wing parties 
dislike. Because it is not yet apparent whether candidates from left– or right–wing parties are more 
likely to adopt and use micro–blogging we pose the following research question instead of a 
hypothesis: 
RQ 1: To what degree do left–wing and right–wing 
candidates use Twitter? 
Regarding the progressive versus conservative ideological dimension, conservative thought promotes 
stability and continuity. In contrast, progressiveness promotes change and reform. Therefore, 
progressive parties and politicians are expected to adopt innovations more quickly than their 
conservative counterparts do. The hypothesis therefore is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2) Candidates that are more progressive will adopt and use Twitter more than 
conservative candidates do. 
Past electoral success 
Gibson and Römmele (2001) suggest that a major party event such as the change of a party leader 
(internal shock) or a massive loss in elections (external shock) could affect a party’s campaign 
strategy. To try to overcome this shock in the upcoming elections, a new campaign strategy might be 
deployed, for instance, a new Web campaign strategy by utilizing new media technology such as 
Twitter. This then would increase the adoption of, for instance, micro–blogging and/or online social 
networking. The hypotheses therefore are: 
Hypothesis 3) The smaller the electoral success in the past, the more it is likely candidates adopt and 
use Twitter. 
Hypothesis 4) The more seats a party has lost in the last elections, the more likely it is that its 
candidates adopt and use Twitter. 
Candidate characteristics 
Not only can parties utilize the Web for increased visibility and better connectedness with voters, 
candidates can do this too. Particularly candidates who are ranked lower on the party list may 
benefit from using the Web for their personal campaign. In the Dutch electoral system, political 
parties prioritize their candidates from high to low. Normally candidates are elected for Parliament 
according to the party’s priority. However, voters may cast a preferential vote for a specific 
candidate. If this candidate receives enough preferential votes, he or she will be elected to 
Parliament, even though other candidates were given a higher priority by the party. Two major 
factors, besides the party program, that increase the likelihood of a candidate being elected are (1) 
the total number of votes the party receives, and (2) the number of preferential votes a candidate 
receives. If Web 2.0 is designed to be bottom–up, facilitating user generated content and creating a 
more level–playing field for all parties and candidates, it should be particularly beneficial to those 
who lack visibility and are the least likely to be elected. As such, personalized campaigning can be 
aimed at generating more preferential votes. The hypothesis then is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5) The less priority the party has given a candidate the more likely it is that the candidates 
adopts and uses Twitter. 
Research shows that women are more likely to use social network sites (Hargittai, 2007), but also 
report they have fewer Internet skills and perform less capital enhancing activities (Hargittai and 
Hinnant, 2008). Research on mobile phone use suggests that women use new media technology 
more sociably than men do (Ran and Lo, 2006). Because these findings on the role of gender in its 
relation to adoption of micro–blogging are somewhat contradictory, the research question is as 
follows: 
RQ 2: To what extent is gender related to adoption and use 
of micro–blogging? 
Effects of micro–blogging on the election outcome 
One of the most important goals to use a particular election campaign strategy is to increase the 
number of votes for the party. Prior research shows evidence of Web campaigning to increase the 
number of votes: Gibson and McAllister (2006) show that having a Web site for campaigning 
purposes leads to more votes. Williams and Gulati (2008), focusing on social network sites, show that 
a candidate’s number of supporters on Facebook is related to that candidate’s vote share at the state 
level. We expect that candidates who blog more actively are more able to connect to potential 
voters, who subsequently are more likely to follow the candidate. Then, if potential voters are more 
likely to follow candidates, it is likely that the number of followers will be reflected in the number of 
votes for this particular candidate. The hypotheses then are as follows: 
Hypothesis 6) The more a candidate uses micro–blogging, the more votes he or she receives. 
Hypothesis 7) The larger a candidate’s online social network, the more votes he or she receives. 
Besides these hypothesized relations, we will test for alternative explanations based on the level of 
establishment of parties and candidate prioritization. For instance, older parties, having a lot of 
experience and having proven to be an established actor in national politics, and having had electoral 
success in past elections, might receive more votes in the current elections than younger, fringe 
parties with little past performance. Furthermore, in the Dutch electoral system, which focuses on 
parties, the parties can order their candidates according the party’s candidate priority. It determines 
which candidates will be elected when no specific voter preference is indicated. If voters cast enough 
so–called preferential votes for a specific candidate, this can override the party’s candidate 
prioritization, resulting in this candidate’s election instead of another candidate. Still, the vast 
majority casts its vote on the #1 on the party list. 
  
 
Methods 
Data 
The names of all candidates of political parties participating in the elections for the European 
Parliament as well as the ranking of the candidate on the party list and the number of votes he or she 
received were obtained from the Electoral Council (www.kiesraad.nl). Subsequently, by using various 
online sources (i.e., search engines, personal Web pages, political party Web pages), candidates who 
used Twitter prior to the elections were identified. This resulted in a list of 36 candidates, 
representing 12 of the 17 parties involved in the EU elections (see Table 1) running for a seat in the 
European Parliament and using Twitter. Six candidates had deleted their account, one of whom 
replaced his account with a new one. Data were downloaded in October 2009 from twitter.com using 
Twitter’s Application Programming Interface (API). The data were downloaded for the period of 1 
February 2009 to 13 October 2009. However, for these analyses only data up to 4 June 2009 (i.e., 
Election Day) will be used. 
Measurements 
Adoption of micro–blogging site. Adoption of Twitter for micro-–logging was measured using two 
indicators: (1) whether or not a candidate was in possession of a Twitter account; and, (2) the start of 
micro–blogging was measured by the number of days prior to Election Day the first tweet was 
posted. 
Micro–blogging activity was measured using several indicators. Message activity was measured by 
counting the total number of messages a candidate posted in the period from the official campaign 
started (17 March 2009) and the Election Day (4 June 2009). Message increase was measured by the 
average daily increase of tweets in the campaign. A low increase indicated that micro–blogging is 
performed in a normal regular fashion, whereas a large increase indicates that micro–blogging is 
used specifically for the campaign. The consistency of micro–blogging was measured by the standard 
deviation of daily micro–blogging activity: a low standard deviation indicates that the candidate has 
developed a routine of daily micro–blogging whereas a high standard deviation indicated that the 
candidate is an irregular micro–blogger. 
To what degree the candidate is communicating with others on Twitter was measured by counting 
the number of @–tweets (i.e., messages sent to a specific twitterer). To standardize the @tweets 
and the non-@–tweets the communication ratio was calculated: lower than one indicates there were 
more non–directed tweets than directed tweets; larger than one indicates there were more directed 
tweets than non–directed tweets. 
Networking activities. We distinguish a number of network characteristics. The candidate’s network 
size consists of all first–degree people in the network, regardless of people who are following the 
candidate or people from the public the candidate is following. The number of followers is the 
network size of people following the candidate while the number of following is the network size of 
people followed by the candidate. Reciprocal following is the number of following relations that are 
mutual between candidate and citizen. The candidate’s follower’s network size is the second–degree 
network size of those that follow the candidate (cf., the friend of a friend). The candidate’s following 
network size is the second–degree network size of those following others. The average number of 
shared connections is the mean number of identical relations candidates have with other people 
(irrespective of it being follower or following). Because the distribution of network indicators is 
heavily skewed, a log transformation was used to normalize them. 
Establishment. Five indicators were used to measure whether parties are well–established. The first 
indicator is the age of the party (in years), measured by subtracting the year the party started using 
the party name. The date of formation was determined by the first appearance of a party under that 
specific name, excluding the years when parties were known under a different name. The second 
measurement is by its past popularity in elections, measured by the number of votes in the last 
national elections (i.e., 2006). The third indicator of whether candidates are member of a well–
established political party was measured by whether the party participated in the national 
government since the last election, was in opposition or was considered a fringe party. The final 
indicator of the degree of establishment of political parties is the number of days a party was part of 
the national government. 
Ideology was measured using data from Van Kersbergen and Krouwel (2008) who classified parties 
on 36 statements in the context of the 2006 general elections. An exploratory factor analysis was 
performed on these data, indicating seven dimensions (Eigen value > 1). However, only two 
dimensions were clearly interpretable: the left–wing versus right–wing continuum and the 
progressive versus conservative continuum. 
Electoral success. The number of votes is the total number of valid votes per candidate. External 
electoral shock was measured by the change in number of seats in parliament a party obtained in 
2006 as compared to 2003. 
Candidate characteristics. The prioritization of the candidates by the political parties themselves 
measures the likelihood of a candidate being elected. The higher the candidate is ranked (indicated 
by a lower number), the more likely the candidate is elected. 
Measures of central tendencies and dispersion of all variables are reported in the Appendix. 
Analyses 
Normally this type of research would involve multivariate analysis. However, due to a small sample 
and the lack of variance of activity for those without a Twitter account, combined with the large 
number of independent variables, using multivariate analysis risks overfitting the data resulting in 
trivial findings (Babyak, 2004). Therefore in this case it was not recommended. Consequently, only 
bivariate analyses are conducted, in particular the comparisons of means as well as the calculations 
of correlations. 
  
 
Results 
Establishment 
Table 1 shows how party characteristics indicative for belonging to the political establishment are 
related to the adoption of micro–blogging (i.e., having a Twitter account and starting blogging early). 
Regarding whether the candidates’ parties are represented in government is unrelated to having a 
Twitter account (χ2 = 1.129, p = .524). However, candidates from parties in opposition started micro-
blogging earlier than others, although the relation is not very strong (F = 2.484, p = .085). Candidates 
from parties that participated in the 2004 EP elections were not more likely to have a Twitter account 
(χ2 = 2.265, p = .116), but started micro–blogging somewhat earlier than others (F = 3.746, p = .054). 
The adoption of Twitter (i.e., subscription date to Twitter) and starting early with actual Twitter 
messaging are unrelated to the party’s participation in the general elections of 2006 (χ2 = 1.052, p = 
.305; F = 1.775, p = .184). Candidates who had a Twitter account were more often members of older 
parties than those that did not adopt micro–blogging (t = 7.853, p = .045), also candidates from older 
parties adopted micro–blogging earlier (r = .144, p = .027). Given these findings, hypothesis 1a 
receives limited support: candidates from older parties and those from parties in opposition signed 
up more frequently for Twitter, whereas candidates from fringe parties did not sign up very often. 
Regarding the actual blogging activities (see Table 2) we see that especially candidates from parties 
in opposition blog more than other candidates (r = .367, p < .05), whereas candidates from fringe 
parties blog less frequently than others do (r = -.298, p < .05). This is also reflected in the directly sent 
messages to specific people (opposition: r = .255, p < .10; fringe: r = .282, p < .05). Furthermore, 
candidates who participated in prior campaigns blog more frequently than others (2004 campaign: r 
= .298, p < .05; 2006 campaign: r = .270, p < .10). This is also reflected in the directly sent messages 
(2004: r = .282, p < .05; 2006; r = .265, p < .10). As such, these results thus far provide no support for 
hypothesis 1b: candidates from fringe parties and candidates from parties that did not participate in 
prior EU elections did not micro–blog as extensively as those from parties already in the Dutch 
Parliament. Although candidates from governing parties are less active than candidates from 
opposition parties, candidates from fringe parties are even less active bloggers. 
As for the network characteristics, Table 2 shows that especially candidates from government parties 
in general have smaller networks (range: r = -.226 – r = -.369, p < .10) and those from opposition and 
fringe parties have larger networks (range: r = .222 – r = .314, p < .10). Candidates who did not 
participate in the 2004 EP elections follow more people than those that did participate. These 
findings show mixed support for hypothesis 1c. 
Ideology 
Regarding the two ideologies (left wing versus right–wing and conservative versus progressive), Table 
1 show no differences between those candidates with a Twitter account and those without. 
However, more progressive candidates adopted micro–blogging earlier than conservative ones (r = 
.200, p = .004). Reviewing the relations between actual micro–blogging activities and social 
networking activities, we find that progressive candidates blog more frequently (r = .323, p < .05), 
have a larger group of followers (r = .308, p < .05) and are more frequently involved in reciprocal 
relations on Twitter (r = .244, p < .10). Hypothesis 2 receives some support but not across the board. 
  
Table 1: Analyses of the relation between the micro–blogging adoption and 
party and candidate characteristics. 
Note: Nadopters=36, Nnon–adopters=252, except for the tests on 
ideology: Nadopters=30, Nnon–adopters=145; a. Mean 
difference=Madopters minus Mnon–adopters 
  
adopters 
(those in 
possession 
of an 
account) 
test 
statistic 
df 
p–
value 
start of 
micro–
blogging 
F 
p–
value 
Establishment   
Party type   χ2=1.291 2 .524   2.484 .085 
governing (%) 13.8%       mean=5.5     
opposition 
(%) 
14.2%       mean=12.4     
fringe (%) 9.4%       mean=4.7     
Participated 
in EP ’04 
          3.745 .054 
yes (%) 14.8% χ2=2.465 1 .116 mean=10.8     
no (%) 8.5%       mean=4.3     
Participated 
in EP ’06 
          1.775 .184 
yes (%) 13.8% χ2=1.052 1 .305 mean=9.8     
no (%) 9.4%       mean=5.0     
# votes ’06 73760a t=-.474 286 .636 r=-.022   .356 
Age of party 
in ’09 
7.853a t=-2.017 286 .045 r=-.114   .027 
Ideology   
Left–wing 
versus right–
.168a t=-.923 173 .357 r=.000   1.000 
wing 
Conservative 
versus 
progressive 
.217a t=-1.257 173 .210 r=.200   .004 
External 
shock 
  
Change in # of 
seats ’03–’06 
-1.647a t=3.849 58 .000 r=-.140   .009 
Individual 
characteristics 
  
Candidate’s 
rank on party 
list 
-7.397a t=7.527 56 .000 r=-.229   .000 
Gender           2.188 .140 
men (%) 11.3% χ2=.731 1 .393 mean=6.7     
women (%) 14.9%       mean=11.8     
  
Election outcome 
The results in Table 1 show that whether or not having a Twitter account or having started micro–
blogging early are unrelated to number of votes their party received in the last 2006 elections (M 
difference = 73760, p = .636; r = .022, p = .356). However, according to the findings presented in 
Table 2, the number of votes received in 2006 elections is negatively correlated to network 
characteristics: the fewer votes a party received in the past, the larger the network sizes (range: r = -
.222 – r = .404, p < .10) and the more frequently the candidates follow a member of the public or 
reciprocates a relationship on Twitter (r = .352, p < .05). These findings show little support for 
hypothesis 3. 
Regarding the external shock hypothesis, candidates who had a Twitter account and those that 
started micro–blogging earlier were running for parties that had lost seats in Parliament in the last 
general elections (M difference = -1.647, p < .000; r = -.140, p = .009). The number of seats lost in the 
last elections however, is unrelated to blogging activities but has a positive relation with the 
candidate’s following net size (r = .226, p < .10). As such, hypothesis 4 receives little support. 
Individual characteristics 
The priority a party has given a candidate is related to having an account: those candidates with a 
Twitter account and started micro–blogging early on were more prioritized (i.e., lower rank number) 
by the party (M difference = 7.397, p < .000 r = -.229, p < .000). Candidates who were higher 
prioritized by the party (i.e., a lower number) blogged more inconsistently (i.e., a larger standards 
deviation) throughout the campaign period (r = .363, p < .05). These higher prioritized candidates 
also showed significantly larger networks (range: r = -.220 - r = .388, p < .10). These finding offer no 
support for hypothesis 5, which predicted the disadvantaged candidates would utilize micro–
blogging more actively. 
Gender was unrelated to having a Twitter account (χ2 = .731, p = .393) as well as to the number of 
days ago the candidate started blogging (F = 2.188, p = .140). Gender was also unrelated to blogging 
activities and to networking activities (RQ 2). 
  
Table 2: Correlates of party and candidate characteristics and micro–blogging activities and network 
characteristics. 
Note: * p<.10, ** p<05, *** p<.01; N=36, except for correlations involving political ideologies: N=30; 
a. Natural log transformation; b. None of the fringe parties in 2009 participated in the European 
Parliament elections of 2004. This results in a perfect negative correlation between ‘fringe party’ and 
‘participation in 2004 EP elections’. This in turn results in perfectly mirrored correlations of these 
variables with micro–blogging activities and network characteristics. 
  
Blog characteristics Network characteristicsa 
# 
num
ber 
of 
twee
ts 
SD 
dail
y 
twe
ets 
Daily 
twee
t 
incre
ase 
Frequ
ency 
of @–
tweet
s 
Ratio 
@tweet/non
@tweet 
Candid
ate’s 
followe
rs net 
size 
Candid
ate’s 
followi
ng net 
size 
Averag
e # 
shared 
connec
tions 
Follo
wer 
of 
candi
date 
Follo
wing 
mem
ber of 
public 
Recipr
ocal 
follow
ing 
Establish
ment 
  
party 
type 
  
governin
g 
-
.130 
-
.116 
.154 -.013 .046 -.297** -.369** -.086 -.250* 
-
.226* 
-
.313*
* 
oppositi
on 
.367
** 
.215 -.058 .255* .140 .142 .115 -.021 
.314*
* 
-.056 .068 
fringe 
-
.298
** 
-
.137 
-.081 
-
.282*
* 
-.205 .121 .222* .107 -.122 
.281*
* 
.223* 
# votes 
GE ’06 
-
.059 
.041 .176 .081 .161 -.368** 
-
.404**
* 
-.188 -.222* 
-
.279*
* 
-
.352*
* 
participa
ted in EP 
’04b 
.298
** 
.137 .081 
.282*
* 
.205 -.121 -.222* -.107 .122 
-
.281*
* 
-.223* 
participa
ted in EP 
’06 
.270
* 
.142 .056 .265* .213 -.092 -.178 -.058 .118 -.213 -.180 
age of 
party 
.170 .175 .015 .218 .253* -.169 -.213 -.109 -.001 -.213 -.170 
External 
shock 
  
change 
in # 
seats 
2003–
2006 
-
.054 
-
.108 
-.019 -.120 -.161 .198 .226* .113 .070 .199 .138 
Political 
ideology 
  
left–
wing 
versus 
right–
wing 
-
.076 
.174 .042 .022 .184 -.079 -.055 -.168 -.223 .014 .002 
conserva
tive 
versus 
progressi
ve 
.323
** 
.186 -.025 .221 .071 .154 .152 -.075 
.308*
* 
.120 .244 
Candidat
e 
characte
ristics 
  
candidat
e’s rank 
on party 
list 
-
.216 
-
.363
** 
-
.271
* 
-.233* -.158 -.254* -.220* -.185 -.132 
-
.388* 
-.204 
gender 
-
.194 
-
.053 
-.043 -.078 .025 -.016 -.047 .029 -.086 .022 -.058 
  
The effects of micro–blogging on election outcome 
The first column in Table 3 shows the correlations of blogging activities and networking activities with 
the number of votes candidates received in the European Parliament elections of 2009 for all 
candidates. The more frequently candidates tweeted, the more votes they received (r = .318, p < 
.01). The less consistently (i.e., larger standard deviation) candidates blogged, the more votes they 
received (r = .422, p < .01). Candidates who increased their blogging closer to Election Day also 
received more votes (r = .307, p < .01). Furthermore, the more messages were sent to a specific 
Twitter account (@tweets), the more votes they received. These findings suggest that using micro–
blogging as campaign tool is effective in getting more votes, supporting hypothesis 6. 
Notable is that the correlations between blogging activities and the number of votes received for the 
subsample of micro–blogging adopters (third column) are similar to the findings in the second 
column (all candidates). This is different for network characteristics: nearly all correlations between 
network characteristics and the number of votes are non–significant. 
Regarding the networking activities based on all candidates, only the number of people following the 
candidate was related positively to the number of votes (range r = .312 – r = .426, p < .01). However, 
the correlations between networking activities and the number of votes, only for candidates having 
an account, shows merely one significant correlation: those that have a large following received 
more votes (r = .328, p < .10), a finding offering only limited support for hypothesis 7. 
Although these findings seem to support our expectations, there might be alternative explanations 
for the relations we found between micro–blogging activities and Twitter network characteristics. 
Therefore we calculated correlations between party characteristics, past–electoral success, and 
candidate characteristics. All party characteristics show significant relations with the number of votes 
received in the 2009 EP elections. Candidates from parties represented in government received more 
votes, as did those that participated in the 2004 EP elections and the 2006 general elections. As for 
the two ideologies, the more right–wing the candidate’s ideology, the fewer votes these candidates 
receive. Regarding the conservative–progressive dimension there is no relation with the number of 
votes candidates received. The number of votes the party received in the general elections of 2006 
correlated positively with the number of votes the candidate received in the 2009 EP elections. The 
rank number given by the party to the candidate in the 2009 EP election (indicating the level of 
priority) correlated negatively with the number of votes they received: the more priority the 
candidate has been given by the party, the more votes he or she receives. The existence of these 
substantial correlations suggests that they should be considered as alternative explanations, possibly 
even able to declare earlier discussed relations between micro–blogging and social networking as 
being spurious. 
  
Table 3: Correlation analysis of cast votes, party and 
candidate characteristics and micro–blogging activities. 
Note: * p<.10, ** p<05, *** p<.01; a. Natural log 
transformation. 
  
Votes per candidate 
all 
candidates 
(n=288) 
subsample of 
micro–blogging 
candidates 
(n=36) 
Adoption   
Tweet start (# days prior to 
Election Day) 
.318*** -.068 
Blog activity   
# of tweets .342*** .310* 
Standard deviation daily 
tweets 
.422*** .511*** 
Daily tweet increase .307*** .306* 
Frequency of @tweets .320*** .337** 
Ratio 
@tweets/non@tweets 
.031 .343** 
Network characteristicsa   
# followers of the party or .426*** .328* 
candidate 
# following a member of the 
public 
.332*** .009 
Reciprocal following .312*** -.129 
Candidate’s followers net 
size 
.394*** .115 
Candidate’s following net 
size 
.385*** .045 
Average # shared 
connections (network 
overlap) 
.354*** .097 
Establishment   
Party type   
Ruling parties .345***   
Opposition parties .320***   
Fringe parties -.632***   
Participated in EP elections 
2004 
.537***   
Participated in general 
elections 2006 
.593***   
# votes general elections 
2006 
.500***   
Age of the party in 2009 .412***   
Ideology   
Left–wing versus right–wing -.132*   
Conservative versus -.007   
progressive 
External shock   
Change in number of seats 
2003–2006 
-.157***   
Candidate characteristics   
Candidate’s rank on party 
list 
-.324***   
Gender -.203***   
  
  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This study focused on (1) acquiring a Twitter account and (2) activities of micro–blogging and social 
networking in political campaigning. Subsequently (3) we explored whether there were indications of 
the effectiveness of micro–blogging and social networking activities in gaining more votes. Micro–
blogging as a campaigning tool was adopted only by a minority of approximately 13 percent of the EP 
candidates in 2009. Regarding candidates’ activities on the micro–blogging site Twitter, the results 
vary quite extensively. Overall, candidates from opposition parties started micro–blogging 
significantly earlier, sending more messages and securing larger follower networks. Candidates from 
fringe parties demonstrated lower blogging activity, but had high networking activity, which was 
often reciprocated. However, fringe parties and lower ranked candidates were not able to utilize 
micro–blogging for their own benefit. This was surprising, especially, because the use is free and 
acquiring Twitter skills is relatively easy. This suggests that a lack of previous campaign experience 
limited the adoption of new campaigning tools, such as those provided on the Web. Alternatively, 
limited resources (e.g., finance, time and knowledge) of fringe parties and candidates might explain 
this. Candidates from parties with a history of campaigning in prior elections were more active in 
using micro–blogging. At the same time, candidates from unsuccessful parties (i.e., fewer votes in 
prior elections) used micro–blogging more extensively. As such, it seemed that micro–blogging was 
associated with being in a disadvantaged position, in particular opposition parties, but excluding 
fringe parties. These findings point towards innovative use of Web campaigning by disadvantaged 
parties and candidates. The parties in power (i.e., governing parties) consolidated their campaign 
efforts: these candidates demonstrated very little adoption of and activity on Twitter. 
What are the benefits of micro-blogging has for politics in general? How would a specific politician 
regard micro–blogging as effective? In this study, we looked at a central outcome variable: the 
number of votes a candidate received. The results clearly show positive relations with micro–
blogging use and the number of votes measured over the entire population of candidates. However, 
because the adoption rate is quite small, these activity indicators measured over the entire 
population reflect the adoption of Twitter and not actual activity. Looking at the subsample of 
Twitter adopters message activities and the number of votes show positive relations, but relations 
between network characteristics and the number of votes are virtually absent. As such, the Twitter 
network size seems to be a limited indicator for voting outcome. Apparently, the composition of 
these online networks differs from groups of people that vote for specific candidates, suggesting the 
degree of homophily (cf., McPherson, et al., 2001) is low. This raises the question whether Norris’ 
(2003) claim that online social networking means ‘preaching to the converted’ instead of ‘preaching 
to the disbelievers’ is still valid. If these networks indeed differ, creating online social networks could 
be worthwhile to expand existing off–line networks. However, these findings also suggest that online 
networks do not lead to more votes. 
Although having established a relation between micro–blogging and the number of votes, one must 
take into account alternative explanations indicated by prior electoral success and the candidate’s 
priority: these also show significant relations with the number of votes these candidates received. 
This suggests that the existing relations could turn out to be spurious. To test this, a larger sample 
would be needed, enabling multivariate analyses. This study then should be replicated in the future, 
preferably using data sets from different countries. 
If the answer to this study’s main question “Is the voter only a tweet away” is a definite “yes”, i.e., 
there is indeed a real effect of micro–blogging activity on the number of votes candidates receive (as 
is suggested by the findings in this study), the question arises how this should be interpreted and 
explained. Is it because followers of the candidates are better informed than those without Twitter, 
that candidates using Twitter were able to convince voters to change their vote? We assume that 
conveying complex messages on complicated political issues by using merely 140 characters is quite 
difficult, unless one uses many messages or (shortened) hyperlinks to direct followers to more 
informative Web pages. Alternatively, are people voting for a particular candidate because the 
candidate managed to present him or herself as more likeable or more approachable? Apparently 
people appreciate becoming friends with politicians on social network sites, even though this 
constitutes a weak tie for bridging purposes as opposed to a strong tie for bonding purposes (Ellison, 
et al., 2007). Thus far, the few existing studies show limited effects. Utz [2] demonstrated that 
visitors to a politician’s SNS page, noticing that a politician indicated reacted to online comments, 
tended to have a more favorable attitude towards a given politician. Baumgartner and Morris (2010) 
on the other hand, demonstrated that the potential for SNS to increase political engagement was 
limited at best: young people used SNS to share pre–existing ideas instead of acquiring new ones. 
Furthermore, the ability of youngsters to learn about politics and candidates from SNS was limited. 
Williams and Gulati (2008) also found a relation between a SNS (Facebook) and election outcome: 
the higher the percentage of supporters for a particular candidate on Facebook per U.S. state, the 
larger the vote share of that candidate in that U.S. state. 
Even though effects seem to be limited, questions about knowledge transfer interactivity, 
personalization and mobilization by new media become more relevant in an age of decreasing 
political involvement. Politicians feel the need to find new and more ways to reach citizens in general 
and potential voters in particular. Still, old channels having a wide and diverse audience 
(interpersonal, television, radio and newspaper) are still being used. However, if the popularity of 
social media use is inherited by future generations and people are increasingly able to avoid 
information that conflicts with their preexisting knowledge, democracy is at risk.  
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Appendix 
  
Descriptive measures for the (sub)population of candidates in the European Parliament elections 
of 2009. 
  All candidates; (N=288)   
Candidates possessing an account; 
(N=36) 
  Minimum Maximum Mean SD   Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
  
Blogging 
activity 
  
Candidates 
with an 
account 
(no=0, yes=1) 
0 1.0 0.1 0.3   1.0 1.0 1.0 0 
Number of 
days active 
account 
0 151.0 8.4 27.6   0 151.0 67.1 47.1 
# of messages 0 1378.0 31.2 139.4   0 1378.0 249.3 321.7 
Standard 
deviation daily 
tweets 
0 17.4 0.4 1.6   0 17.4 3.3 3.5 
Daily tweets 
increase 
-0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0   -0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 
Frequency of 
directly 
addressed 
messages 
0 7.8 0.2 0.8   0 7.8 1.3 2.0 
Communication 
ratio 
0 3.5 1.0 0.3   0 3.5 0.8 0.8 
  
Network 
characteristics 
  
# followers of 
the party or 
candidate 
0 2723.0 41.8 222.4   0 2723.0 334.8 552.0 
# following a 
member of the 
public 
0 1296.0 11.7 84.2   0 1296.0 93.3 224.3 
# of reciprocal 
following 
0 1282.0 16.6 103.1   0 1282.0 132.9 267.0 
Candidate’s 
followers 
network size 
(2nd degree) 
(*1000) 
0 187346.3 1103.1 11285.3   0 187346.3 8825.2 31212.7 
Candidate’s 
following 
network size 
(2nd degree) 
(*1000) 
0 13620.5 142.2 991.0   0 13620.5 1137.6 2624.7 
Average # 
shared 
connections 
0 8.5 0.4 1.4   0 8.5 3.5 2.5 
  
Establishment   
Candidates 
from 
  
ruling parties 
(no=0, yes=1) 
0 1.0 0.2 0.4   0 1.0 0.2 0.4 
opposition 
parties (no=0, 
0 1.0 0.5 0.5   0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
yes=1) 
fringe parties 
(no=0, yes=1) 
0 1.0 0.3 0.5   0 1.0 0.3 0.4 
Participated in 
European 
Parliament 
elections 2004 
(no=0, yes=1) 
0 1.0 0.6 0.5   0 1.0 0.8 0.4 
Participated in 
general 
elections 2006 
(no=0, yes=1) 
0 1.0 0.7 0.5   0 1.0 0.8 0.4 
Age of the 
party in 2009 
0 63.0 23.5 22.0   0 63.0 30.3 23.2 
# votes (*1000) 
in general 
elections 2006 
0 2608.6 758.2 871.8   0 2608.6 822.7 899.2 
  
External shock   
Change in # 
seats 
-9.0 9.0 -1.3 3.3   -9.0 2.0 -2.7 3.1 
  
Ideology   
Left–wing 
versus right–
wing 
-1.3 1.4 -0.0 0.9   -1.3 1.4 0.1 1.0 
Conservative 
versus 
progressive 
-1.4 1.1 0.1 0.9   -1.4 1.1 0.3 0.9 
  
Individual 
characteristics 
  
Candidate’s 
rank on party 
list 
1.0 30.0 11.2 7.7   1.0 20.0 4.8 5.1 
Gender 
(female=0, 
male=1) 
0 1.0 0.7 0.5   0 1.0 0.6 0.5 
  
Voting 
outcome 
  
# votes (*1000) 
in EP elections 
2009 
0 579.8 15.8 65.1   0 579.8 80.2 149.0 
  
 
